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Review
Leland B. Yeager (2001) Ethics as Social Science: The Moral Philosophy of Social
Cooperation, Northampton: Edward Elgar.
What is a good Austrian subjectivist to do? On the one hand, he believes that human action
is driven by subjectively held values, perceptions and expectations that are, in themselves,
unobservable and vary across individuals, and that this implies that, in many cases, there is
no automatic tendency for action to be coordinated around a set of commonly held values,
perceptions and expectations;1 and further that all normative pronouncements that rely on
such coordination for the application of value metrics to social outcomes are, in its absence,
doomed to failure. On the other hand, he also believes that it ought to be possible to say
something normatively meaningful about social outcomes in general and economic policy
in particular. But how can one judge policies in the absence of an agreement on both the
affects that it will produce and on how to value these effects?
At one level the problem is solved by the so-called value-fact dichotomy—while the
economist-qua-economist cannot judge between outcomes as objectively better or worse,
he can, using good economic science, often describe the most likely outcomes and point
out where they deviate from what policy-makers and others intend or desire. So, for exam-
ple, while the economist cannot say that minimum wages are necessarily a bad thing, he
presumably can say that the imposition of an effectively-enforced minimum wage above
the market wage will have the effect of raising the level of unemployment especially for
those who are the targeted beneﬁciaries of such a policy.
This is likely to be less than completely satisfactory, however, for the analyst who wants
to be able to say more, for example, that societies that adopt regulatory policies like mini-
mum wages will achieve a lower level of coordination than those who do not. The problem
here is “measuring” the “level of coordination.” For a subjectivist it is clear that human
action may be discorrdinating as well as coordinating, depending on whether plans are
facilitated or frustrated—the abolition of minimum wages will frustrate some peoples’
plans and enhance the plans of others—and there appears no way in principle to weigh
the former against the latter. One cannot simply tally up the number of plans advanced
against the number frustrated or some such crude arithmetic, under the assumption that all
plans are equal in importance. This, of course, is an instance of the species of problems
falling under what we may call the “incommensurability problem.” Its most familiar form
is the inability to make “interpersonal comparisons of utility” which, depending on how
“utility” is interpreted is actually a catchall phrase implying that thoroughgoing subjec-
tivist economists are impotent in the face of alternative economic policies.2 So the original
dilemma remains.
Suchwasmystateofmind,thoughdimlyperceived,whenasayounggraduateeconomistI
discovered Leland Yeager’s approach to these questions (Yeager 1978). I found in Yeager’s
article a profoundly simple, compelling, yet neglected approach to the role of policy in140 REVIEW
economic theorizing. And I have returned with admiration over the years to his intermittent
revisitingoftheseissues(Yeager1984,1985,1988,1993).Now,atlast,thereisafulllength
work communicating his valuable insights.3
I thus approached this book expecting to ﬁnd in one place a useful extended treatment
and summary of Yeager’s general approach. I was not disappointed, though the book was
a little different from what I had expected. It turned out to be much more than what I
expected, and I found it a little harder work than I had anticipated. It is more than just a
rehashorexpansionofhisearlyrelatedwork.Itisreallyacompletereworkingandin-depth
extension. The layout is somewhat unconventional in that fundamental ideas are introduced
and discussed early on and then further developed and reexamined later at various points in
the book as their interrelationships become more manifest. So there is a kind of spiraling
effect that requires the reader’s careful concentration. Rather than attempting to summarize
the work chapter by chapter, the reader may thus be better served if I try just to articulate
the basic thesis leaving it up to the reader to discover for herself the full richness of the
work.
As I understand it Yeager’s general point is rather simple. In making pronouncements
about the world, certain fundamental distinctions apply. First there is David Hume’s ba-
sic distinction between normative and positive statements—“ought” statements versus “is”
statements—andtheimplicationthatonecanneverderiveanoughtfromanis.Onecannever
derive a proposition about how things ought to be (what policy ought to be adopted, which
typeofinstitutionalstructureistobepreferred,etc.)exclusivelyfromanobservationofhow
things are. One has to provide a way of evaluating consequences and circumstances. Nor-
mative criteria must be combined with positive observations to yield policy prescriptions.
“No one can prove in a purely objective way, free of any trace of evaluation or intuition
or emotion, that considerateness and kindness are good and that torture and murder are
wrong” (p. 18).4 Obviously, positive observations (investigations of the nature of the natu-
ral and social world) are a legitimate (and Yeager vigorously afﬁrms important) part of the
policy-recommendation or comparative-systems exercise. Thus “ethics” is al e gitimate part
of social science. Indeed the relationship goes both ways. Ethical sensibilities inform what
ought to be studied and how the results are to be evaluated and these results in turn may
inﬂuence such evaluations causing, for example, a change in priorities. Ethics illuminates
economics and economics illuminates ethics.
It is this last point that leads to the second type of distinction that needs to be made—
that between normative judgments that are fundamental and normative judgements that
are speciﬁc. The former are more sweeping and inclusive, the latter are less so. Speciﬁc
value judgments can be seen to rely on, and are instrumental to, more fundamental values;
at the highest level fundamental values are not derived from anything. Fundamental nor-
mative judgments are thus an expression of a value not derived from any more ultimate
value.
The distinction between fundamental and speciﬁc (or instrumental) values would appear
to be logically undeniable—a kind of Misesian apodictic imperative. It also clariﬁes much
intherelationthatdifferentapproachestotheroleofethicsinsocialscience—contractarian,
natural rights, or any other—bear to one another. The basic point is this: whatever criterion
one uses as a justifying or motivating cause for a preference or action must be eitherREVIEW 141
functioning in the service of some more ultimate value or else must itself be the most
ultimate, the last word in the matter. Otherwise in the attempt to seek justiﬁcation one gets
either an inﬁnite regress or a circular argument. “Asking how to validate a value judgment
means asking what acknowledged higher norm it falls under” (p. 28). Understanding this
suggests a search for the most ultimate value. But clearly this search cannot be informed
by reason or by induction (again in line with Hume). “The closest one can come to arguing
for a fundamental value judgment is to employ effective rhetoric in identifying an intuition
that one expects one’s listeners to share” (p. 30).
Yeagersuggeststhatinthiscontextallroadsleadbacktosomeperceptionofwhatconsti-
tutesthe“goodlife”fortheindividualandwouldincludeevocativewordslike“ﬂourishing”
“peace” and of course, that most serviceable of all words, “happiness.” The happiness-
criterion would seem to be the most ultimate of criteria. If it is not, then some other word
willsimplyhavetobesubstitutedforwhatitisthatstandsbehind(orabove)allotherethical
criteria and eventually an end must be found. This applies to all justiﬁcation systems be
it the assertion that societies ought to be organized by the kind of implicit consensus to
be found in a “social contract” (how does one know what hypothetically would/should be
agreed to?); or by the discernment and exercise of “natural rights” (which rights are those;
how does one know which rights are “intrinsic,” those that serve “human happiness?”); or
by the discovery and interpretation of the “word of God”; or any other set of criteria. In
this he claims to be an indirect-utilitarian. All normative arguments ultimately come down
to some ultimate criterion like happiness or utility broadly conceived. All arguments come
downtothesupportoroppositiontopoliciesandactionsonthebasesonhowtheycontribute
or detract from one’s conception of what constitutes the “good society.” In this sense all
such arguments are and must be consequentialist. And recognizing and acknowledging this
leads to better research and policy discussion.
For one thing it suggests (echoing a theme of Milton Friedman’s) that all apparent dis-
agreements ought to be considered potentially resolvable until it can be shown that there is
a real difference in fundamental values. It is no use arguing with someone who believes in
“evil” or is a pure narcissist, but in many cases apparent disagreements could be resolved if
agreement in the fundamentals or near-fundamentals (“we both want peace and security for
our citizens”) could be uncovered and the argument turned to the question of how best to
achieve these shared goals. “In real life, disputes over courses of action almost never hinge
on divergent ultimate intuitions about intrinsic value” (...).
Ultimate values are not inﬂuenced by states of the world, but instrumental values may
be. That is to say (as intimated above) factual knowledge about how the world is can never
inﬂuence what one feels about the ultimate good, but it can inﬂuence one’s opinion about
how it ought to be achieved. In economic terminology, factual knowledge may help clarify
the trade-offs involved and help us choose between instrumental values. “People do not
automatically understand all the probable consequences of contemplated changes in policy.
They do not fully understand how particular measures may eventually change the general
characteroftheirsociety”(p.33).Inthiswayoneseesagaintherelationshipbetweenethics
and social science.
Wordsmaybeinadequatetodescribethemostultimateofvalues—theonethatliesbehind
allnormativepronouncements,whichisprobablywhywordslike“utility”and“ﬂourishing”142 REVIEW
are so fraught with controversy. Conversations about this thus tend to circulate endlessly
as protagonists grasp for ever more expressive terms of what it is that we all ultimately
strive for, as individuals and for the societies in which we live. Thus Yeager suggests that
such a search may prove unfruitful and that we should, instead, focus on the near ultimate
criterionidentiﬁedbymanysocialphilosophersas“socialcooperation”—hencethesubtitle
of the book. “Direct appeal to an actually ultimate normative criterion is rarely necessary.
Socialcooperationﬂourishesthroughinstitutions,rules,andpracticesthatimprovepeople’s
chances of predicting each other’s behavior and coordinating their activities. Voluntary
cooperation accords better than coercion with each person’s having projects, purposes, and
idealsofhisownandwithhishavingonlyonelifetolive.Emphasisonvoluntarycooperation
warns against imposing unfair sacriﬁces on individuals for the supposed greater good of a
greater number” (pp. 81–82).
This last suggests that what we have here is no crude arithmetic utilitarianism that has
been fodder for the creation of so many “utility monsters.” In fact I wonder if the word
“utilitarian,” like the word “consequentialist” might not be too emotionally charged, given
its exegetical history, to ﬁt what Yeager is trying to say. Whatever one calls it, however, the
indirect-utilitarianapproach,asexplainedandvigorouslydefendedbyYeager,isformidably
compelling in its logic.
Thishasnotstoppedthecritics,ofwhichtherearemany.Yeager’sapproachisprovocative.
He has tried to anticipate arguments—indeed he appears to have considered every possible
criticism (though of course one can never be sure). I cannot here deal with them all or
even a large subset. I will mention only one, the criticism that his approach is vacuous, that
it says essentially nothing since the notion of the “utility” implied in the indirect-utility
approach is wide enough to accommodate any possible objection. Yeager’s argument is a
species of rule-utilitarianism, as opposed to act-utilitarianism, so as to rule out exclusive
consideration of the utility attached to single acts. Acts must be considered in the context
of the time and place that they occur with an eye to their relationship to other acts past
and future. Trade-offs may have to be made but they cannot avoid appealing to some
notion of what is best for the achievement of social cooperation. Does this come down
simply to saying the best is what one considers best—what is good is what one considers
good?
This brings me back to the dilemma with which I started. In appraising alternative policy
prescriptions one apparently cannot avoid either articulating what one believes to be the
likelyeffectsofthepoliciesconsidered(apositivejudgment)andwhatonebelievesaboutthe
desirability or otherwise of these effects (a normative judgment). The former is inﬂuenced
by uncertainty relating to the way the world works (including the effects of subjectively
held expectations, etc.) and the belief expressed is “subjective” to that extent; the latter is
“subjective” in a different way—it is an expression of subjective value. But this does not
mean that the subjectivist in either sense need avoid (or, indeed, can avoid) entering into
policy discussions. It simply means that one must do so with open eyes. Thus, when an
economist says that this or that policy is “efﬁcient,” what she really means is that, in her
judgment,itwillproduceparticulareffectsandthattheseeffectsarelikelytobeconduciveto
fosteringthekindofsocietythatisdesirablegiventhealternatives.Inmakingthisargument
she may be required to articulate in great detail why she believes this; why the policyREVIEW 143
will lead to the results she claims and why these results should be considered desirable
(efﬁcient). And in making the latter argument she cannot avoid the indirect-utilitarian logic
that Yeager has explained. My dilemma appears solved. But the reader must ﬁnd this out
for herself.
This book reﬂects Yeager’s wide reading and conscientious attempt to ﬁnd precedents to
his assertions. He makes no claim whatsoever to originality and is particularly clear about
his debt to Henry Hazlitt’s work (1964 [1972]). Perhaps after all he is too modest. The
particular blend of ideas and the clarity of expression is surely quite original and I found
that reading Hazlitt’s masterpiece was much easier after reading Yeager, an example of
synergy. The book is wide-ranging, reaching into ethical philosophy (there is a wonderful
appendix on the forever troubling question of free-will) and scientiﬁc reality, including the
role of culture and genetics in economic development. Ethics apply to human beings and
therefore must take account of the human condition. Yeager provides windows into many
strands of literature. He confronts many puzzles and paradoxes. The book will proﬁt those
who read and reread it.
Notes
1. To be sure, some types of expectations do tend to converge, otherwise action would not be possible. For a
discussion of how different types of knowledge imply different types of convergent processes (see Lewin
1997).
2. Economists have, of course, agonized over such questions in welfare economics. The most straightforward and
intuitive approach is to use the criterion of Pareto optimality to identify changes for which the gains outweight
the loss regardless of who receives or bears them. A number of problems have beset this approach. In the ﬁrst
place, the decision to use the Pareto criterion is itself not a scientiﬁc (non-normative) decision. Even setting
this aside we must face a host of well-known problems associated with the obvious connection between the
size of the gains and losses and their distribution—a connection that implies, among other things, that Pareto
optima are not unique and, indeed, may be inﬁnite in number (see, for example, Yeager 1978, 1985).
3. While my admiration of Yeager’s indirect utilitarian approach is obvious, I should hasten to disclose that I am
not competent to judge his work as a professional philosopher might. For such a judgment the reader will have
to look elsewhere. I conﬁne myself here to assessing the value of this book to economists, in general, and to
Austrian economists in particular. I am dealing here with Yeager the economist/political economist, not Yeager
the philosopher/political philosopher.
4. Yeager is an admirer of Hume in an age when it has become fashionable to think him pass´ e. I, and I imagine
many other pedestrian thinkers, have always thought Hume’s distinction to be undeniable and, for what its
worth, I found Yeager’s admission that he too has never been able to understand the Kantian claim to have
bridged the is-ought divide quite reasuring.
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